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Abstract
This study examines the eects of higher transport eciency on cost-reducing R&D
investment and welfare in a two-way duopoly trade model with an imperfectly compet-
itive transport sector. We show that, corresponding to the degree of the R&D spillover,
higher transport eciency can aect investment in a U-shaped fashion. We also show
that higher transport eciency can reduce total output and consumer surplus. By com-
paring the two cases of rm-specic carriers and duopoly carriers, we demonstrate that
total output in the case of duopoly carriers is lower than that in the case of rm-specic
carriers if the spillover is suciently large. Higher transport eciency and competition
in the transport sector may harm consumers.
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1 Introduction
For the past several decades, technical improvements in the transportation industry
have contributed to transport cost reductions and growth in world trade. As reported
by Levinson (2006), products that traditionally take considerable money and time
to carry can be transported within shorter time periods and at lower cost because
of containerization.1 Such improvements in transport eciency due to containerized
shipping have sharply increased imports and imported items and brought higher benet
to consumers. According to Broda and Weinstein (2004), U.S. imported items increased
four-fold between 1972 and 2001, raising real income by about 3%. As improvements in
transport eciency have continued,2 industrial R&D spending in some OECD countries
has also rapidly increased. For instance, the ratio of industrial R&D spending to GDP
in the United States was about 1.12% in 1981, about 1.42% in 1995, and about 1.73%
in 2008.
This study examines the eect of higher transport eciency on a rm's R&D invest-
ment and welfare. Although some studies examine the relationship between a rm's
R&D investment and transport (or trade) cost reductions in oligopoly models, the trans-
port cost is exogenously given and hence the role of carriers and technical eciency of
transportation have garnered insucient attention (e.g., Ghosh and Lim 2013; Haaland
and Kind 2008; Long, Ra, and Stahler 2011; Morita 2012). Some authors nd that
R&D investment always decreases or increases with transport cost reductions (Ghosh
and Lim 2013; Haaland and Kind 2008; Morita 2012); others nd that transport cost
reductions have a non-monotonic eect on investment (Long, Ra, and Stahler 2011).
In contrast to existing studies, by considering an imperfectly competitive transport
sector and R&D spillovers, we show that, in a single framework, a transport cost re-
duction that results from an improvement in eciency can lead to both more and less
1Talley (2000) indicates that technological improvements in ocean shipping through containerization
reduced ocean freight rates, and increased containerized trade by 433% between 1980 and 1996 (in
TEUs). Hummels (2007) also emphasizes the cost-saving eect of containerized shipping.
2For example, containerships continued to grow in size in the 1980s. According to Kuby and Reid
(1992), in 1969 no eets were larger than 1,600 TEU; by contrast, about 20% of the containerships
built and ordered between 1980 and 1985 exceeded 2,600 TEU. They also emphasize that line-haul
costs per ton-mile decrease with ship size.
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investment according to the degree of the spillover.
Following Takauchi (2015), who considers international R&D rivalry with a monopoly
carrier, we provide a two-way Cournot duopoly model with an imperfectly competitive
transport sector. We consider two symmetric regions: each region has a homogeneous
product market and a single producing rm. While neither rm charges fees for local
supply, it must use carriers and pay a per-unit transport charge to export its prod-
uct. To ship cargoes, these carriers incur a quadratic operation cost. We consider the
slope of carriers' cost to be the degree of transport eciency|a steeper cost represents
lower technical eciency in the transport industry. Firms engage in cost-reducing R&D
activities with exogenous spillovers. The sequence of events is as follows: rst, each
rm invests in cost-reducing R&D. Second, the transport charge is determined in the
transport market. Lastly, each rm decides its export and local supply.
We rstly examine the case that in each region a single carrier exists that ships
the local rm's product (the rm-specic carrier hereafter). We show that higher
transport eciency always raises R&D investment if there is no R&D spillover. Further,
it aects investment in a U-shaped fashion if the spillover is intermediate and always
reduces investment if the spillover is suciently high. The transport charge decreases
as transport eciency improves; it also decreases as spillovers decrease. For smaller
spillovers, the export cost is low and the eect of the transport charge reduction is
dominant. For larger spillovers, the export cost is high and the eect of the transport
charge reduction weakens. However, higher transport eciency reduces the transport
charge, meaning the positive eect becomes stronger as transport eciency improves.
For this reason, as long as the spillover is intermediate, the investment is U-shaped
for transport eciency. We also show that higher transport eciency can reduce total
output and consumer surplus. A larger spillover reduces the production cost, increasing
the rm's output and raising the transport charge. Imports are thus lower for larger
spillovers. Then, higher transport eciency does not suciently increase imports and
the decline in local supply is large; hence, total output falls.
We further investigate the quantity competition of the two carriers and show that,
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for suciently high R&D spillovers, each region's total output and consumer surplus in
the case of multiple carriers is lower than that in the case of rm-specic carriers. This
competition between carriers makes demand more elastic|a small rise in the transport
charge decreases demand markedly. For this reason, the transport charge and output
are inverted U-shaped for the spillover. While total output in the case of rm-specic
carriers always increases with spillovers, that in the case of duopoly carriers decreases
when the spillover rises above a certain level. This result suggests that competition
in the transport sector may harm consumers. We believe that our model oers a new
insight into the context of trade and transportation.
This study is related to research that introduces the transport sector in various trade
models (Abe, Hattori, and Kawagoshi 2014; Behrens, Gaigne, and Thisse 2009; Behrens
and Picard 2011; Francois and Wooton 2001; Ishikawa and Tarui 2015; Takauchi 2015).3
Francois and Wooton (2001) incorporate an imperfectly competitive transport sector
into a competitive trade model and examine the eect of tari reductions. Abe, Hat-
tori, and Kawagoshi (2014) examine trade and environmental policies in a two-way
duopoly where transportation generates pollution. Behrens, Gaigne, and Thisse (2009)
and Behrens and Picard (2011) examine the eects of endogenous freight rates on the
agglomeration of rms. While Behrens, Gaigne, and Thisse (2009) focus on the carrier's
market power, Behrens and Picard (2011) focus on a logistics problem associated with
roundtrips. Ishikawa and Tarui (2015) also examine the logistics problem and consider
the role of trade policies in oligopoly markets. While all these studies use dierent
models to provide useful insights, they do not consider the R&D activities of rms.
The present study is closely related to Takauchi (2015), which considers downstream
cost-reducing R&D rivalry with monopoly carriers. Although Takauchi (2015) focuses
on the eciency of R&D technology, the author does not consider the role of R&D
spillovers, the carrier's operation cost, and competition in the transport sector.
This study is also related to several works that examine exogenous transport cost
reductions in various oligopoly models (Ghosh and Lim 2013; Gurtzgen 2002; Haaland
3Matsushima and Takauchi (2014) consider the eect of the privatization of seaports on port usage
fees and welfare in a two-way duopoly model.
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and Kind 2008; Liu and Mukherjee 2013; Long, Ra, and Stahler 2011; Marjit and
Mukherjee 2015; Morita 2012). Ghosh and Lim (2013), Haaland and Kind (2008), and
Morita (2012) examine the relationship between exogenous transport (trade) costs and
R&D investment in dierent oligopoly settings; however, they do not consider upstream
agents that have market power. By contrast, Gurtzgen (2002), Liu and Mukherjee
(2013) and Marjit and Mukherjee (2015) consider the role of upstream agents that have
market power (i.e., labor unions and input suppliers) under dierent market structures.
However, they do not consider the R&D activities of rms. Therefore, we believe
that the model presented herein complements existing studies of endogenous/exogenous
transport costs and R&D investment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline
model and timing of the game. Section 3 derives the results of the baseline model.
Section 4 examines the case that two carriers compete in the transport sector and
compares the results of the baseline model with those of the extended model. Section
5 concludes. All proofs are shown in the appendices.
2 Model
We consider a two-way duopoly trade model with rm-specic carriers, as in Takauchi
(2015). By incorporating two factors|R&D spillovers and carriers' quadratic operation
costs|into Takauchi's (2015) model, we examine the eects of transport eciency on
rm behavior and welfare under cost-reducing R&D rivalry.4
There are two symmetric regions, H and F , whose markets are segmented. In
region i (i = H;F ), a single downstream rm produces a homogeneous product for
local supply and exports.5 We call the downstream producing rm rm i (i = H;F ).
These two rms compete a la Cournot in both the local and the other region's markets.
The inverse market demand function in region i is pi = a   qii   qji (i 6= j), where pi
is the product price in market i, qii is the local supply of rm i, qji is the exports of
4In Section 4, we further examine quantity competition in the transport sector.
5In other words, we consider a type of Brander and Krugman's (1983) duopoly model.
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rm j, and a is a positive constant. Before the production stage, rms engage in cost-
reducing R&D competition with spillovers. To reduce the unit production cost, c, rm
i undertakes investment, xi. Owing to the positive spillovers of developed knowledge,
some ratio of rm j's R&D results ows into rm i, and thus rm i's unit production
cost after investment is c  xi   xj (i 6= j), where  2 [0; 1] is the exogenous spillover
rate.6 R&D spillovers are not considered in Takauchi (2015). We assume that rm i
does not pay the transport charge when it supplies the local market. By contrast, rm i
must pay a per-unit transport charge, ti, to export its product because it does not have
suitable facilities to carry out long-distance transportation and must use a rm-specic
carrier to transport its product to the other region's market. We call this upstream
agent carrier i (i = H;F ). The prot of rm i is dened by i  ii + ij   x2i :
the local supply prot is ii  (a   qii   qji   (c   xi   xj))qii, the export prot is
ij  (a  qjj   qij   (c  xi   xj)  ti)qij , and the R&D cost is x2i , for i = H;F and
i 6= j.7
Carrier i makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to rm i and determines its transport
charge, ti. The prot of carrier i is dened by
ui  tiqij   
2
(qij)
2;
where  2 [0;1[ denotes the eciency of carriers' transport technology. When carriers
have higher cargo-handling ability (e.g., improvements in marine engines and adoption
of large ships), they have a lower transportation cost: a lower  thus corresponds to
higher transport technology. This transport technology is also ignored in Takauchi
(2015).8
We consider the following three-stage game. In the rst stage of the game, each
rm decides its level of R&D investment, xi. In the second stage, each carrier decides
6This specication is popular and frequently used in the literature on cost-reducing R&D rivalry.
See, for example, D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Ghosh and Lim (2013), and Kamien, Muller,
and Zang (1992).
7To focus on the role of transport eciency and downstream rms' R&D spillovers, we do not
consider the technical eciency in R&D investment; that is, we set the coecient of the R&D cost to
unity (i.e., k = 1 in kx2i ).
8In Takauchi (2015), the carrier's prot is dened by ui  tiqij .
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its transport charge, ti. In the third stage, each rm decides its local supply, qii, and
exports, qij . We use the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) as the equilibrium
concept.
3 Firm-specic Carriers
The SPNE of the game is solved by using backward induction.
Third stage: The rst-order conditions (FOCs) for the prot maximization of rm i
are @i=@qii =  2qii qji+xi+xj = 0 and @i=@qij =  qjj 2qij+xi+xj ti = 0,
where   a  c > 0. These yield the following output in the production sub-game:
qii(tj ;x)=
+ (2 )xi + (2 1)xj + tj
3
; qij(ti;x)=
+ (2 )xi + (2 1)xj   2ti
3
:
Here, x denotes the vector of R&D investment, i.e., x = (xi; xj).
Second stage: Carrier i's transport demand is TDi = qij(ti;x), that is,
TDi =
+ (2  )xi + (2   1)xj
3
  2
3
ti: (1)
From the carrier's prot and (1), the FOC for the prot maximization9 of each carrier
is
@ui(ti;x)
@ti
=
1
9
[(3+2) + (3+2)(2 )xi + (3+2)(2 1)xj   4(3+)ti] = 0:
This yields the transport charge in the transportation sub-game.
ti(x) =
(3 + 2)[+ (2  )xi + (2   1)xj ]
4(3 + )
: (2)
First stage: By using the third-stage output, second-stage transport charge (2), and
rm's prot, we obtain the following FOC for the prot maximization of each rm:10
@i(x)
@xi
=  128xi
8
+
4(2  )[+ (2  )xi + (2   1)xj ]
8(3 + )2
+
(7  2 + 2)[(5 + 2) + (7  2 + 2)xi   (2  (7 + 2))xj ]
8(3 + )2
= 0:
9The second-order condition (SOC) is satised, i.e., @2ui(ti;x)=@t
2
i =  4(3 + )=9 < 0.
10The SOC for the rm's prot maximization is satised, i.e., @2i(x)=@x
2
i = ( 79   44 + 82  
68  8  122)=(8(3 + )2) < 0.
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By solving @i(x)=@xi = 0 for xi, we obtain R&D investment in SPNE. Hereafter, the
variables with an asterisk \" denote those in SPNE:
xi =
[43 + 24+ 42   2(7 + 2)]
D
; (3)
where D  101 + 72+ 122   (29 + 20+ 42) + 2(7 + 2)2 > 0.
From (3), outputs, total output, and consumer surplus in SPNE are
qii =
4(3 + )(5 + 2)
D
; qij =
8(3 + )
D
; (4)
Qi = q

ii + q

ji =
4(21 + 13+ 22)
D
; CSi =
(Qi )
2
2
: (5)
Firm i's prot is
i =
2
D2
[A+ 4(7 + 2)(43 + 24+ 42)   4(7 + 2)22];
where A  2327 + 3600+ 20402 + 5123 + 484.
Each carrier's transport charge and prot are
ti =
4(3 + )(3 + 2)
D
; ui =
322(3 + )3
D2
: (6)
We set the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The unit production cost after R&D investment has a positive value,
i.e., c > xi + x

j .
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From (4) and (6), we obtain Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. (i) @ti =@ > 0, @q

ii=@ > 0, and @q

ij=@ < 0; (ii) @t

i =@ > 0, @q

ii=@ >
0, and @qij=@ > 0.
Part (i) is explained as follows. When transport eciency improves, the carrier's
cost curve is atter and its cost falls; hence, each carrier tries to decrease its charge
to raise its prot (i.e., @ti =@ > 0). Since the export cost falls as  decreases, rms
increase those exports as  decreases (i.e., @qij=@ < 0). Through the strategic substi-
tutability in market competition, an increase in rm j's exports reduces rm i's local
11For example, suppose a c = 1 and c = 1. Then, 1 > xi+xj = (1+)[43+24+42 2(7+2)]=D
holds for  2 [0; 1] and  2 [0;1[.
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supply (i.e., @qii=@ > 0). Part (ii) of Lemma 1 is intuitive: a higher R&D spillover
reduces rm i's production cost and thus increases its output (i.e., @qii=@ > 0 and
@qij=@ > 0). Since total output in region i is Q

i = q

ii + q

ji, total output increases
with the spillover. Furthermore, an increase in rm i's exports implies that carrier
i's transport demand increases. Corresponding to this demand expansion, each carrier
raises its charge (i.e., @ti =@ > 0).
The equilibrium R&D investment, (3), yields the following result.
Proposition 1. (i) An improvement in transport eciency, i.e., a decrease in ,
increases a rm's investment if and only if  > (7   8)=2. (ii) A rise in R&D
spillover increases a rm's investment if and only if
 < ()  301 + 254+ 76
2 + 83   4p2(3+)2(7+2)3
2(7 + 2)2
:
Fig. 1 shows Proposition 1.
[Fig. 1 around here]
Here, we consider part (i). Some studies of trade with R&D investment consider the
eect of a trade or transport cost reduction on a rm's R&D activities (Ghosh and Lim
2013; Haaland and Kind 2008; Long, Ra, and Stahler 2011; Morita 2012) and they
oer contrasting results. Although our model diers from these studies, we can relate
those results to ours corresponding to the degree of R&D spillovers. Higher transport
eciency reduces the transport charge, which has two eects: one is the positive eect
that encourages investment through a reduction in the export cost, while the other is
the negative eect that discourages investment through increased competition in the
local market. The positive eect depends on the export cost itself: if  is lower, exports
are larger and the positive eect is stronger. If  = 0, R&D investment always rises as 
decreases (see the curve evaluated  = 0 in panel (b) of Fig. 1). This case corresponds
to Ghosh and Lim (2013) and Haaland and Kind (2008). In their two-way duopoly
models, there is no upstream agent and the positive eect of transport cost reductions
is always dominant.
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For 0 <  < 7=8,12 R&D investment is U-shaped for . Since a rise in  raises
the transport charge and dampens exports, the positive eect goes down as  goes up.
On the one hand, the export cost is larger when  is larger, meaning that the positive
eect is dominated by the negative one when  is suciently large. However, as 
decreases, the export volume increases and hence the positive eect is stronger again
(see the curve evaluated  = 0:5 in panel (b) of Fig. 1). This case corresponds to the
result of Long, Ra, and Stahler (2011), who consider rm heterogeneity (productivity
is stochastically distributed among rms). In their oligopoly model, if the transport
cost is suciently low, the chance of becoming an exporter is large and R&D spending
rises with the transport cost reduction. However, if the transport cost is suciently
high, the chance of becoming an exporter is small, the marginal benet of R&D is
small, and hence investment decreases as the transport cost falls.
For   7=8, the positive eect is dominated by the negative one (see the curve
evaluated  = 0:9 in panel (b) of Fig. 1). This case corresponds to the result of Morita
(2012), who incorporates skilled and unskilled labor in a general equilibrium setting.
In his duopoly model, a trade cost (specic tari) reduction sharply raises the wage
for skilled labor and this makes the negative eect dominant.
The logic behind part (ii) is as follows. Whether a rise in spillovers increases R&D
investment depends on the level of transport eciency (see panel (c) of Fig. 1). In-
vestment decreases with  if  < 1 ' 0:50; it has an inverted U-shape for  if
1    2 ' 2:80787; and it increases with  if  > 2.13 A rise in  has two
eects: one is the positive eect that encourages rm i's investment through a reduc-
tion in its production cost and the other is the negative eect that discourages rm
i's investment through a reduction in its rival's production cost. The negative eect
depends on the size of the rival's exports. From Lemma 1, higher transport eciency
reduces the transport charge. Since a lower export cost increases exports, exports are
suciently large if  is suciently small. Then, an expansion of exports due to a rise
12The threshold (7   8)=2 = 0 if  = 7=8. Also,  = (7   8)=2 = 0 ,  = 7=(2(4 + );
 = 7=(2(4 + )! 0 as !1 (see panel (a) of Fig. 1).
13Note that 1 ' 0:50 is the solution of () = 0 and 2 ' 2:80787 is the solution of () = 1.
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in  is stronger, implying that the negative eect dominates the positive one. When
1    2, investment is an inverted U-shape for .14 Because  has a larger value
and exports are lower than those in the case of  < 1, the negative eect that results
from a rising spillover becomes weaker. A lower  also reduces the rival's exports,
meaning that the negative eect weakens further. When  > 2, the transport charge
is suciently high and this strongly dampens the rm's export activity. Because the
positive eect is dominant, investment increases with the spillover.
Let us examine the eect of an improvement in transport eciency on welfare.15
We rstly consider the eects of  on the consumers in each region. From (5), we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. An improvement in transport eciency, i.e., a decrease in , reduces
total output and consumer surplus in each region if and only if
 >
25  13   142 + 2p(1 + )(1 + 2)(7  2)
2(22 + 3   3) :
Fig. 2 illustrates Proposition 2.
[Fig. 2 around here]
Proposition 2 implies that an increase in the transport cost can raise total output
and consumer surplus if the degree of the R&D spillover is high.16 To understand this
result, the carrier and its charge play a key role. Since the transport charge decreases
as the spillover decreases, a lower (higher) export cost corresponds to a smaller (larger)
spillover. When the spillover is smaller, the imports of region i have a larger volume
and thus the eect of the export cost reduction on the exporter (rm j) is stronger.
An improvement in transport eciency largely increases imports, meaning that total
14The results in the case \1  " largely dier from those of Ghosh and Lim (2013).
15Since a rise in the R&D spillover reduces production costs, welfare in each region monotonically
increases with .
16Although Gurtzgen (2002) and Marjit and Mukherjee (2015) do not consider R&D rivalry, they
also nd a similar result. Gurtzgen (2002) assumes a two-way duopoly model in which rms engage in
dierentiated Bertrand competition with labor unions. Marjit and Mukherjee (2015) assume a one-way
trade model in which downstream is dierentiated Cournot competition with free entry and upstream
is a perfect/imperfect labor market.
10
output increases (see the curve evaluated  = 0:6 in panel (b) of Fig. 2). When the
spillover is large, total output is U-shaped for the level of transport eciency. The
transport charge has a higher value for a larger  as well as a higher value for a larger
. Imports in region i are signicantly small when  and  become larger. Then, the
eect of a reduction in rm i's local supply is stronger and total output decreases as
 decreases. However, under a larger , total output rises when transport eciency
exceeds a certain level. Although  is high, a decrease in  suciently increases rm
j's exports if  is suciently low. For this reason, total output is U-shaped for  (see
the two curves evaluated  = 0:9 and  = 1 in panel (b) of Fig. 2).17
Welfare in region i is dened as the sum of consumer surplus, rm i's prot, and
carrier i's prot, SW i  CSi +i + ui :
SW i =
2
D2

E + 4(7 + 2)(43 + 24+ 42)   4(7 + 2)22 ; (7)
where E  6719 + 8832+ 43522 + 9603 + 804.
From (7), we obtain Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. An improvement in transport eciency, i.e., a decrease in , reduces
welfare in each region if and only if  > g(), where
g 1()  1211 + 384  36
2   163 +pG
4(1099 + 912+ 2562 + 243)
and G  2566+372485+5906084+39174083+131645522+22324032+15296337.
Fig. 3 shows Proposition 3.
[Fig. 3 around here]
Welfare has three shapes: (i) an increase for a decrease in ; (ii) U-shaped when
 = 0 (the highest transport eciency) is maximized; and (iii) U-shaped but  = 0
is not maximized (see panel (b) of Fig. 3). To consider the result, let us decompose
17By plugging  = 1 into (), we obtain (
p
30  1)=2. See panel (a) of Fig. 2.
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\@SW i =@" into three parts:
@SW i
@
=
@CSi
@| {z }
(+)=( )
+
@i
@|{z}
(+)
+
@ui
@|{z}
( )
;
where \(+)" denotes a positive sign, \( )" denotes a negative sign, and \(+)=( )"
is both a positive and a negative sign. As seen in Proposition 2, an improvement in
transport eciency (i.e., a decrease in ) increases consumer surplus as long as the
spillover is not too large. Each rm's prot decreases as  decreases (@i =@ > 0).
18
The reason is as follows. While rms do not incur a transport cost for local supply,
they must pay it to export. Thus, exports are less ecient compared with local supply.
Since an improvement in transport eciency increases less-ecient exports but reduces
ecient local supply, prot decreases. By contrast, each carrier's prot increases as 
decreases (@ui =@ < 0). A lower  increases exports, meaning that the carrier's demand
expands and its prot rises.
The degree of the spillover aects the sign and intensity of these three parts. When
there is no spillover ( = 0), imports are larger and the eect of import expansion
due to a decrease in  becomes suciently strong. Because the carrier's prot and
consumer surplus increase markedly, welfare also rises as  decreases (see the curve
evaluated  = 0 in panel (b) of Fig. 3).
When there is a spillover ( 6= 0), welfare is U-shaped for . For a larger  (i.e.,
 > g()), the eect of import expansion that results from a decrease in  is lower. Since
the reduction in the rm's prot is relatively large, welfare decreases as  decreases.
However, if  is below a threshold level, imports become larger again and the carrier's
prot and consumer surplus suciently rise as  decreases (see the curve evaluated
 = 0:7 in panel (b) of Fig. 3). On the one hand, if  is larger, the area in which
a decrease in  reduces consumer surplus appears and that area expands with  (see
Proposition 2). For extremely high , the welfare-enhancing eect of a decrease in  is
small and thus a decrease in  does not suciently raise welfare even if  is suciently
low (see the curve evaluated  = 1 in panel (b) of Fig. 3).
18The eect of a change in  on the rm's and carrier's prot is calculated in Appendix B.1.
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4 Competition in the Transport Sector
Section 3 showed the eects of transport eciency for rm-specic carriers. Hence,
it is necessary to examine the case of competition in the transport sector. We thus
relax the assumption of a \monopoly carrier for each rm" and introduce quantity
competition.19 Consequently, the welfare change that results from improving transport
eciency is the same as the case for rm-specic carriers.20 On the contrary, we nd
that R&D investment and total output (i.e., consumer surplus) in the case of a rm-
specic carrier can be larger than that in the case of the duopoly transport sector.
There are two carriers in the transport sector; carrier i belongs to region i (i = H;F )
and competes a la Cournot in the transport market. The prot of carrier i is given
by ui  tzi   (z2i )=2 for i = H;F , where t is the transport charge and zi is carrier
i's transport volume. The timing of the game is the same as described in the previous
section and we solve the game in a similar way to before.21
From the market-clearing condition zH + zF = TD = qHF + qFH , each carrier faces
the following transport demand:
TD =
2+ (1 + )(xH + xF )
3
  4
3
t: (8)
Under (8), each carrier decides its transport volume to maximize its prot. The second-
stage transport charge is
t(x) =
(3 + 4)[2+ (1 + )(xH + xF )]
4(9 + 4)
: (9)
By solving the rm's prot maximization problem maxxi i(x) = maxxifii(x) +
ij(x)  x2i g, we obtain the following R&D investment in SPNE:
xi =

J

263 + 216+ 482   (7 + 4)(19 + 4) ; (10)
where J  5(7+4)(11+4)   2(65+56+162) + (7+4)(19+4)2 > 0. Hereafter,
variables with a double asterisk \" denote the variables in the SPNE of the game in
19Abe, Hattori, and Kawagoshi (2014), Behrens, Gaigne, and Thisse (2009), Francois and Wooton
(2001), and Ishikawa and Tarui (2015) also assume quantity competition in the transport sector.
20Similar to the case of rm-specic carriers, an improvement in transport eciency aects welfare
in a U-shaped fashion. This is also the same for the rm's prot. See Appendices B.2 and B.3.
21We derive the equilibrium outcome in each sub-game in Appendix C.
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which the transport sector is a Cournot duopoly.
Outputs, transport volume, and consumer surplus in SPNE are
qii =
4(7 + 4)(9 + 4)
J
; qij = z

i =
16(9 + 4)
J
; (11)
Qi =
4(9 + 4)(11 + 4)
J
; CSi =
(Qi )
2
2
: (12)
The transport charge and each carrier's prot are
t =
4(3 + 4)(9 + 4)
J
; ui =
642(9 + 4)2(3 + 2)
J2
: (13)
Eqs. (11) and (13) yield the following result.
Lemma 2. (i) @t=@ > 0, @qii =@ > 0, and @q

ij =@ < 0. (ii) If   65+56+16
2
(7+4)(19+4) ,
@t=@  0, @qii =@  0, and @qij =@  0; otherwise, @t=@ < 0, @qii =@ < 0,
and @qij =@ < 0.
Part (i) in Lemma 2 is the same as the result for Lemma 1. Because transport
eciency directly aects export activity (i.e., a lower  reduces the transport cost
and charge), it increases imports but decreases local supply by increasing local market
competition. Part (ii) states that the transport charge and output (as well as total
output) are inverted U-shaped for the spillover.22 This is because, in the case of duopoly
carriers, transport demand is more elastic than that in the case of rm-specic carriers.
Although a rise in  reduces the production cost and can increase output, this demand
expansion also raises the transport charge and can reduce output. In the case of duopoly
carriers, transport demand drops markedly as  increases when the transport charge
becomes suciently high. If  rises above a certain level and the transport charge
suciently rises, the charge begins to fall to avoid decreasing transport demand. Hence,
(inverse) transport demand in the case of duopoly carriers is atter (more elastic) than
that in the case of rm-specic carriers. From (1) and (8),
j@ti=@TDij| {z }
Firm-specic carrier
= 3=2 > 3=4 = j@t=@TDj| {z }
Duopoly carriers
:
22Whether the change in the spillover increases output depends on the sign of @t=@. See Appendix
A.5.
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On the one hand, when  is larger, exports are lower (@qij =@ < 0). Because the
negative eects of a higher transport charge weaken, the range in which output and the
transport charge rise expands (i.e., the threshold 65+56+16
2
(7+4)(19+4) increases) as  increases.
From (10), we obtain the following.
Lemma 3. (i) @xi =@ > 0 if and only if
 <
(7+4)(19+4)(263+216+482)  2p2(9+4)2(7+4)3(19+4)3
(7 + 4)2(19 + 4)2
:
(ii) @xi =@ > 0 if and only if  > (5  4)=4.
Fig. 4 illustrates Lemma 3.
[Fig. 4 around here]
In contrast to the result of Proposition 1, in the case of duopoly carriers, the negative
eect of investment (i.e., the eect of a decrease in its rival's production cost) is stronger
compared with the case of rm-specic carriers. The key factor to this result is that,
as previously explained in Lemma 2, a higher  aects the transport charge markedly,
which is inverted U-shaped for . By contrast, the transport charge always increases
with  in the case of rm-specic carriers (see Lemma 1). That is, in the case of
duopoly carriers, a rise in  can suciently reduce a rival's exports and weaken the
positive eect of a rise in . For this reason, the area in which a rise in  always
increases R&D investment does not appear (see panel (a) of Fig. 4). Part (ii) is the
same as the result of Proposition 1. Since a change in transport eciency on output
and the transport charge is the same as the case of rm-specic carriers (Lemmas 1
and 2), a similar result holds for R&D investment (see panel (b) of Fig. 4).
Finally, we consider whether competition in the transport sector raises the rm's
R&D investment and each region's total output (consumer surplus). From eqs. (3) and
(10), for the ranking of R&D investment, we obtain the following.
Proposition 4. Firm i's R&D investment in the case of Cournot duopoly carriers,
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xi , is lower than that in the case of rm-specic carriers, x

i , if and only if
 >
1251 + 2004+ 12422 + 3363 + 324
2(15 + 4)(42 + 60+ 272 + 43)
:
Fig. 5 shows Proposition 4.
[Fig. 5 around here]
The result of Proposition 4 can be explained by those of Proposition 1 and Lemma
3. From Proposition 1, in the case of rm-specic carriers, R&D investment increases
with the spillover except for the case that transport eciency is not too high (also see
panel (a) of Fig. 1). On the contrary, in the case of duopoly carriers, the area in which
investment increases with  is limited to the case that  is suciently small and  is
relatively large (see Lemma 3 and panel (a) of Fig. 4). That is, in many cases, R&D
investment decreases with . Therefore, for a suciently high , investment in the case
of rm-specic carriers can exceed that in the case of duopoly carriers.
From (5) and (12), for the ranking of total output, we obtain the following.
Proposition 5. Total output in the case of Cournot duopoly carriers, Qi , is lower
than that in the case of rm-specic carriers, Qi , if and only if
 >
p
(9+4)N   (141 + 258+ 722)
2(7 + 2)(201 + 285+ 1202 + 163)
;
where N  1199097 + 3166956 + 35139602 + 21458883 + 7812004 + 1694085 +
202246 + 10247.
The result of Proposition 5 is illustrated in Fig. 6.
[Fig. 6 around here]
While total output in the case of rm-specic carriers increases with R&D spillovers
(Lemma 1), that in the case of duopoly carriers decreases when the degree of the
spillover rises above a certain level (Lemma 2). Therefore, as in Proposition 4, total
output (and consumer surplus) in the case of duopoly carriers can be lower than that
in the case of rm-specic carriers if the degree of the spillover is suciently high. This
16
result implies that if the fruit of R&D largely ows (i.e.,  is close to 1), competition
in the transport sector may harm consumers.23
5 Conclusion
This study considers the eects of an improvement in transport eciency on a rm's
R&D investment and welfare. Although industrial R&D investment has rapidly ex-
panded as improvements in transport eciency have continued, previous works have
paid insucient attention to the relationship between the technical eciency of trans-
portation and R&D investment. In a simple two-region duopolistic R&D rivalry model
with an imperfect competitive transport sector, we show that R&D investment rises
as transport eciency improves if there is no R&D spillover; is U-shaped for transport
eciency if the spillover is intermediate; and always decreases as transport eciency
improves if the spillover is suciently high. We also show that although higher trans-
port eciency reduces the transport charge, it can reduce total output and consumer
surplus in each region. We further extend the case of rm-specic carriers to the case
of the Cournot competition of duopoly carriers. The spillover aects the transport
charge and output in a U-shaped fashion in the case of duopoly carriers, but it always
increases the transport charge and total output in the case of rm-specic carriers. For
this reason, total output and consumer surplus in the case of duopoly carriers can be
lower than those in the case of rm-specic carriers if the spillover is suciently high.
That is, competition in the transport sector can harm consumers. Our model gives
heed to the results brought about by technology improvements in the transport sector,
and hence we believe that our work provides a new insight into studies of trade and
transportation.
In this study, we do not consider the role of public investment. While the govern-
ment may invest to enhance the quality of transportation and its relevant facilities,
this aspect is beyond the scope of our analysis. In the situation of international trade
23It can also be found, by using Mathematica plotting, that when  is close to 1 and  is not too
small, the welfare level in duopoly carriers is lower than that in rm-specic carriers.
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within the transport sector, it may be fruitful for future research to examine govern-
ments' investment strategies for transport facilities.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1. The comparative statics analysis of (4) and (6) yields
@ti
@
=
4
D2

261+188+362   (81+44+42) + (90+56+82)2 > 0;
@qii
@
=
4
D2

31+44+122   (19 4 42) + (94+56+82)2 > 0;
@qij
@
=
8
D2
 (115+72+122) + (31+24+42)   22 < 0;
@ti
@
=
4(3 + )(3 + 2)
D2
[29 + 20+ 42   4(7 + 2)] > 0;
@qii
@
=

5 + 2
3 + 2

@ti
@
> 0;
@qij
@
=

2
3 + 2

@ti
@
> 0: Q.E.D.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1. (i) By dierentiating (3) wrt. , we have @xi =@ =
f32(a   c)(3 + )[2(4 + )   7]g=D2. Thus, @xi =@  0 if   (7   8)=2. (ii) By
dierentiating (3) wrt. , we have
@xi
@
=

D2

B1   4(7 + 2)(43 + 24+ 42) + 4(7 + 2)22

;
where B1   167+144+3122+1283+164. We solve @xi =@  0 for  and have
  301+254+762+83 4
p
2(3+)2(7+2)3
2(7+2)2
. Q.E.D.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2. CSi = (Q

i )
2 =2 and @CSi =@ = Q

i (@Q

i =@),
meaning that sign(@CSi =@) depends on the sign of @Q

i =@. By dierentiating (5)
wrt. , we have
@Qi
@
=
4
D2

4(22 + 3   3)2 + 4(142 + 13   25)+ 982 + 43   199 :
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We solve @Qi =@  0 for  and have   25 13 14
2+2
p
(1+)(1+2)(7 2)
2(22+3 3) . Q.E.D.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3. By dierentiating (7) wrt. , we have
@SW i
@
=
162(3 + )
D3
 
2E2
2   E3   1573  1128  1882

;
where E2  1099 + 912 + 2562 + 243 and E3  1211 + 384   362   163. We
solve @SW i =@  0 for  and have   g 1()  1211+384 36
2 163+pG
4(1099+912+2562+243)
, where
G  2566 + 372485 + 5906084 + 39174083 + 131645522 + 22324032+ 15296337.
Q.E.D.
A.5. Proof of Lemma 2. (i) By dierentiating (11) and (13) wrt. , we have
@t
@
=
32
J2
[S + 8(125  38 + 532)+ 16(15  2 + 72)2] > 0;
@qii
@
=
32
J2
[5(1 + 2)(7 + 4)2   2(79 + 8  162)] > 0;
@qij
@
=  64
J2
[425  122 + 1012 + 8(5  2 + 2)(9 + 2)] < 0;
where S  3(365  134 + 1492) > 0.
(ii) By dierentiating (11) and (13) wrt. , we have
@t
@
=
8(3 + 4)(9 + 4)
J2
[65 + 56+ 162   (7 + 4)(19 + 4)];
@qii
@
=

7 + 4
3 + 4

@t
@
;
@qij
@
=

4
3 + 4

@t
@
:
The signs of @qii =@ and @q

ij =@ depend on the sign of @t
=@. By solving @t=@ 
0, we have   65+56+162(7+4)(19+4) . Q.E.D.
A.6. Proof of Lemma 3. By dierentiating (10) wrt. , we have
@xi
@
=

J2

Lx + (7 + 4)
2(19 + 4)2   2(7 + 4)(19 + 4)(263 + 216+ 482);
where Lx   17015  30384  153922  17923+2564. By solving @xi =@  0 for
, we have   (7+4)(19+4)(263+216+482) 2
p
2(9+4)2(7+4)3(19+4)3
(7+4)2(19+4)2
. By dierentiating
(10) wrt. , we have @xi =@ =
256(9+4)
J2
(4   5 + 4). Therefore, @xi =@  0 i
  (5  4)=4. Q.E.D.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4. From (3) and (10), xi   xi = 8DJ

1251 + 2004 +
19
12422+3363+324  2(15+ 4)(42+ 60+272+43). By solving xi   xi  0
for , we have   1251+2004+12422+3363+324
2(15+4)(42+60+272+43)
. Q.E.D.
A.8. Proof of Proposition 5. From (5) and (12), Qi  Qi = 4DJ

(11 + 4)(174 +
177+ 662 + 83)  3(47 + 86+ 242)   (7 + 2)(201 + 285+ 1202 + 163)2.
By solving Qi   Qi  0 for , we have  
p
(9+4)N (141+258+722)
2(7+2)(201+285+1202+163)
and N 
1199097+3166956+35139602+21458883+7812004+1694085+202246+10247.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B. Derivation of the other results
B.1. The signs of @i =@ and @u

i =@. By dierentiating 

i and (6) wrt.
, we have @i =@ =

322(3 + )[2(9 + 2)(39 + 24 + 42)2   (15 + 2)(57 +
28 + 42)]
	
D3 +

962(3 + )(99 + 110+ 522 + 83)
 
D3 > 0 and @ui =@ =
322(3 + )2[2(9 + 2)2 + (33 + 28+ 42)   3(43 + 24+ 42)]	D3 < 0.
B.2. Sign of @i =@. When the transport sector is a duopoly, a decrease in  can
raise the prots of rms. Each rm's prot in Section 4 is
i =
2(7 + 4)
J2

Lp + 2(19+4)(263+216+48
2)   (7+4)(19+4)22 ; (A1)
where Lp  2153 + 3604 + 22242 + 4483. By dierentiating (A1) wrt. , we
have @i =@ =

2562(9 + 4)2[5(3 + 4)(7 + 4)   4(9 + 4)(11 + 4) + (3 +
4)(73 + 28)2]
	
J2. We solve @i =@  0 for  and have kl    ku, where kl 
(198+160+322) pK
(3+4)(73+28) , ku  (198+160+32
2)+
p
K
(3+4)(73+28) , and K  16209   19920   662082  
422403  79364. K  0 for    ' 0:340202, meaning that kl (increasing for ) and
ku (decreasing for ) do not have a real value for  > ; kl = ku if  = .
B.3. Signs of @Qi =@ and @SW

i =@. By dierentiating Q

i wrt. , we have
@Qi =@ =
32
J2
[(2 + )(43 + 136 + 482)   5(11 + 4)2]. We solve @Qi =@  0
for  and have   q  2
p
2(9+4)2(43+136+482) (43+136+482)
43+136+482
. The threshold q is
decreasing for  and lim!1 q =  1 + 2
p
2=3 ' 0:632993.
The equilibrium welfare level in Section 4, SW i = CS

i +

i + u

i , is
SW i =
2
J2

M + (7+4)(19+4)(263+216+482)   (7+4)2(19+4)22 ; (A2)
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where M  109031+ 184752+1188162+345603+38404. By dierentiating (A2)
wrt. , we have @SW i =@ =
20482(9+4)
J3

R2 4(92+69+122) 40(2+)(5+2),
where R  275 + 624 + 3682 + 643. We solve @SW i =@  0 for  and have  
sw  2(92+69+12
2)+2
p
(9+4)2(444+838+4692+803)
275+624+3682+643
. The threshold sw is decreasing
for  and lim!1 sw = 0, meaning that SW i is monotonically decreasing for  i
 = 0.
Appendix C. Outcomes of each sub-game in Section 4.
Third stage: The rm's third-stage output is qii(t;x) =
1
3 [+(2 )xi+(2 1)xj+t]
and qij(t;x) =
1
3 [+ (2  )xi + (2   1)xj   2t].
Second stage: From the market-clearing condition TD = qHF (t;x) + qFH(t;x), in-
verse transport demand is t = 2+(1+)(xH+xF )4   3(zH+zF )4 . By using this equation and
the prot of carrier i, we obtain carrier i's reaction function: zi =
2+(1+)(xH+xF )
2(3+2)  
3
2(3+2)zj (i 6= j). From this, the second-stage transport volume is zi(x) = 2+(1+)(xH+xF )9+4 .
This yields (9).
First stage: The maximization problem maxxi i(x) = maxxifii(x) + ij(x)   x2i g
yields the following FOC24: @i(x)=@xi = 0 ,  2xi + 12(9+4)2

4+ 1xi   [7 + 4 
(11 + 4)]xj
	
1 +
1
8(9+4)2

2(7 + 4) + 2xi   [(11 + 4)   (25 + 12)]xj
	
2 = 0,
where 1  (11 + 4)  (7 + 4) and 2  25 + 12  (11 + 4). From the FOC, we
obtain (10).
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Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 1.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2.
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Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 3.
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Figure 4: Illustration of Lemma 3.
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